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Extended predictive minds: do Markov Blankets matter?
Abstract:
The extended mind thesis claims that a subject’s mind sometimes encompasses the
environmental props the subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently, the
debate over the extended mind has been focused on Markov Blankets: the statistical
boundaries separating biological systems from the environment. Here, I argue such a focus is
misplaced, because Markov Blankets neither adjudicate, nor help us adjudicate, whether the
extended mind thesis is true. To do so, I briefly introduce Markov Blankets and the
free-energy principle in section 2. I then turn from exposition to criticism. In section 3, I
argue that using Markov Blankets to determine whether the mind extends will provide us with
an answer based on circular reasoning. In section 4, I consider whether Markov Blankets help
us track the boundaries of the mind, answering in the negative. This is because resorting to
Markov Blankets to track the boundaries of the mind yields extensionally inadequate
conclusions which violate the parity principle. In section 5, I further argue that Markov
Blankets led us to sidestep the debate over the extended mind, as they make internalism about
the mind vacuously true. A brief concluding paragraph follows.
Keywords: Extended Mind, Free-energy Principle, Markov Blankets, Active Inference
1 - Introduction
Vehicle externalism (also known as the extended mind thesis) claims that a subject’s
thinking machinery sometimes includes the environmental props the subject interacts with1
while solving cognitive tasks (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Hurley 2010). Importantly, vehicle
externalism is only a claim concerning the physical constituents (vehicles) of the thinking
machinery. Hence, it is compatible with different accounts of how the thinking machinery
functions, including computationalism (Clark 2008), ecological psychology (Chemero 2009),
enactivism (Di Paolo 2009), dynamicism (Palermos 2014) and more. As a consequence, how
1 Here, I use the phrase “vehicle externalism” to stay neutral on the distinction between extended cognition,
extended mind and extended consciousness. This is because I’m interested in vehicle externalism per se, rather
than any particular form it might assume - so, I needed a “catch all” term. Similarly, I use “thinking machinery”
to indicate the system that is supposed to extend, be it a cognitive, conscious or mental system.
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vehicle externalism should be articulated and whether or not it is true are intensely debated
topics (Kiverstein 2018; Rowlands et al. 2020).
The recent popularity of “predictive” approaches to the mind, especially Friston’s
free-energy principle (henceforth FEP e.g. Friston 2010), generated a wave of “predictive”
vehicle externalism (e.g. Clark 2017a) counterbalanced by equally consistent wave of
“predictive” vehicle internalism (e.g. Hohwy 2016). Their clash rapidly centered around
Markov Blankets (henceforth MBs), focusing on questions like: “is there a privileged MB
surrounding the thinking machinery?” (e.g. Ramstead et al. 2019); and: “if yes, does it
enshroud only the brain?” (e.g. Hohwy 2016).
Here, I wish to take a step back from these questions, to observe the role MBs play in the
debate over “predictive” vehicle externalism, arguing that MBs neither adjudicate, nor help to
adjudicate, whether vehicle externalism is true. In other words, my aim here is to examine
whether MBs play a valuable role in determining whether vehicle externalism is true,
suggesting that MBs do not play such a valuable role.
My plan is as follows. In the next section, I introduce the FEP, focusing on MBs. In
section 3, I argue that, on their own, MBs do not provide a solution to the debate over vehicle
externalism. In section 4, I argue that MBs do not even simplify the tracking of the
boundaries of the thinking machinery, showing that, at least thus far, the usage of MBs has
delivered unpalatable verdicts and has been incompatible with the parity principle. In section
5, I argue further that MBs leads us to sidestep, in an important sense, the debate over vehicle
externalism, as they make vehicle internalism vacuously true. A brief concluding paragraph2
follows.
2 A “disclosure statement”: I endorse vehicle externalism. But my aim here is not to defend it. My only aim is to
argue that the debate over vehicle externalism should leave MBs behind. So the problem I raise in section 5 is
not that MBs make vehicle internalism true, but that they do so vacuously.
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Before I start, however, I need to explicitly place two caveats.
Caveat #1: my focus concerns exclusively the role MBs are supposed to play in the debate
over vehicle externalism. So, I will characterize the FEP as it is characterized in that debate;
namely, as an account of life and cognition “from first principles”. I will thus introduce the
FEP as a non-empty, conceptually/mathematically laden description of how living systems
persist through time and display adaptive and intelligent behaviors (cfr. Bruineberg 2018;
Bruineberg et al. 2018; Clark 2017a; Colombo and Wright 2018; Constant et al. 2019;
Corcoran et al. 2020; Fabry 2017; 2021; Friston 2013; Hohwy 2016; 2017; Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019a, 2019b; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Kiverstein and Sims 2021; Linson et al.
2018; Palacios et al. 2020; Ramstead et al. 2019; Sims 2020). This is not the only way in
which the FEP can be understood ; but issues concerning the FEP status as a theoretical3
object lie beyond the scope of the present treatment.
Caveat #2: relatedly, I will assume that the FEP comes with genuine ontological
commitments, among other things, to Markov Blankets as real and objective boundaries of
living/biological systems (see references given above).4
These caveats seem to me justified by the principle of charity: the theoretical status and
commitments of the FEP are surely debated, but, given my aim here, the principle of charity
suggests to assume each party engaged in the dispute over “predictive” vehicle externalism
correctly interprets the FEP and its commitments. Moreover, these caveats entail a reading of
the FEP that is charitable, at least given the purpose of this paper. Vehicle externalism and
vehicle internalism are fact stating claims concerning what really and objectively are the
4 As above, this is not universally accepted; for instance (Bruineberg et al. 2020) argue that these commitments
are due to a projection of formal properties of models over systems modelled, (Menary and Gillett 2020) claim
that such commitments are not intrinsic to the FEP, but descend from an implicit adoption of a
pythagorean/platonic metaphysics, and (Baltieri et al. 2020, van Es 2020) suggest to take an instrumentalist
stance towards the FEP more generally.
3 For example, it could be understood as a framework or toolbox for model-building (e.g. Andrews 2021; Raja et
al. 2021) or as a conceptual/mathematical analysis of systems in general (e.g. Hipolito 2019; Friston 2019).
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constituents of our thinking machinery. They are not epistemic claims concerning how the
thinking machinery is best studied. Nor are they claims spelling out otherwise useful fictions.
Thus, when looking for the boundaries of the thinking machinery, one looks for something
objective and “out there”. So, if one takes MBs to be such boundaries, one must take them to5
be objective and “out there”.
Notice that these two caveats make my claim conditional: what I’m going to argue is that,
given the assumptions spelled out via caveat #1 and #2, MBs neither adjudicate nor help to
adjudicate whether vehicle externalism is true.6
Notice further that these two caveats entail that I will not systematically distinguish MBs
as formal properties of variables (or “Pearl Blankets”) from MBs as real and objective
boundaries of free-energy minimizing system (or “Friston Blankets”; see Bruineberg et al.
2020; Menary and Gillett 2020). For such a distinction is either not acknowledged in the
literature on the FEP I’m interested in, or, if it is acknowledged, it is downplayed, in a way
that strongly suggests that “Friston Blankets” are an unproblematic development of “Pearl
Blankets” (see, for instance, Wiese and Friston 2021). This (I believe) makes the present
treatment complementary to the analysis offered in (Bruineberg et al. 2020; Menary and
Gillett 2020). If I understood them correctly, these authors contend (among other things) that
6 One might wonder what would happen if one were to let these assumptions go. I think that what would happen
is roughly this: that one stops regarding the FEP as a non vacuous, mathematically/conceptually leaded
description of how living systems persist through time and display intelligent/adaptive behaviors, and that one
stops regarding MBs as real and objective boundaries of living and/or cognitive systems. And once one stops
taking MBs in such a way, one has let go of the idea that MBs matter when it comes to adjudicating the
boundaries of cognition.
5 Notice, for the sake of clarity, that when vehicle internalist and vehicle externalist make claims about the
“boundaries of the thinking machinery” they need not commit to the existence of what I will here call a fence;
that is, a physical object having contiguous spatiotemporal parts which demarcate the perimeter of the
spatiotemporal region within which all and only the constituents of the thinking machinery are located. The
“boundaries” of the thinking machinery might, but need not, consist in such a fence. For example, Chalmers
(2008; 2019) has suggested that it is intuitive to think at such boundaries as constituted by perception and action.
Clearly, Chalmers is not suggesting that perception and action form a single physical object with contiguous
spatiotemporal parts encasing all the cogs of the thinking machinery. Rather, he is suggesting that perception and
action are (intuitively) the functional interfaces separating the thinking machinery from the environment.
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the usage of MBs to demarcate the real and objective boundaries of free-energy minimizing
systems needs to be justified further. Here, I will instead assume that such an usage is
perfectly justified (this is conceded by the two caveats above) and argue that, even in this
case, MBs are not able to play the desired role, at least when it comes to demarcating the
boundaries of the free-energy minimizing thinking machinery.
With these caveats in place, it is now time to briefly introduce the FEP (readers familiar
with the literature I’m considering here might wish to skip to section 3).
2 - The Free-energy principle: a selective sample of selective sampling
The FEP states that the persistence of living systems is guided by free-energy minimization
(Friston 2011; 2012; 2013; Friston and Stephan 2007). Consider an organism’s prolonged
existence. In order to continue to exist through time, an organism must find, in the space of all
its possible states, the subset of states compatible with its prolonged existence, which it must
continuously visit and re-visit. For instance, a human that “wants to” continue existing must
continue to visit states in which their bodily temperature is around 36.6°. Failures to occupy
these states might cause harm or even death (e.g. if the bodily temperature goes to 154°).
The FEP formalizes this idea claiming that an organism’s existence defines a probability
distribution over the space of all its possible states, and that such a probability distribution has
low entropy ; i.e. it is sharply peaked around the states that the organism must continuously7
re-visit to prolong its existence. Since entropy is the long term average of surprisal (i.e. the
negative logarithm of a state’s probability), minimizing surprisal over time will ensure that
the organism constantly revisits the “right” states (Friston 2011: 92-93). So, an organism's
prolonged existence can be ensured by a process of surprisal avoidance.
7 Notice that this is not physical entropy, but rather information-theoretic entropy. See (Linson et al. 2018) for
further discussion of this point.
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Yet organisms cannot track surprisal. They can, however, track its upper bound, which is
(variational) free-energy (Buckley 2017). Organisms can track it because it is a function of
two probability densities organisms can track; namely a generative density, which specifies
the joint probability of worldly and sensory states given a model of how sensory states are
produced; and a recognition (or variational) density encoding the system’s estimate about
worldly states. The recognition density is encoded by the system’s internal states; whereas the
generative density is “entailed” by the system’s dynamics, meaning that the system’s
dynamics realize the inversion of a generative model (i.e. maps the organism’s sensory states
on their most likely causes; see Ramstead et al. 2020a: 7-8). Since free-energy is an upper
bound on surprisal, continuously minimizing it will afford organisms a way to avoid
surprisal-inducing states. Thus, an organism's prolonged existence can be understood as a
continuous process of free-energy minimization.
Free-energy can be minimized in two ways: either by perceptual inference, which
optimizes the recognition density so that free-energy becomes a tight bound on surprisal, or
through active inference (i.e. self-generated changes of states), which avoids surprisal directly
(see Bruineberg et al. 2018: 2413-2428 for further discussion of these points). Perceptual and
active inference can be taken as corresponding to a form of perception and action (e.g.8
Corcoran et al. 2020). Importantly, in more complex systems free-energy minimization9
affords an optimal way to balance explorative (or epistemic) actions and exploitative (or
pragmatic) actions, while making the agent learn the most efficient and minimalistic routes to
success (e.g. Friston et al. 2016; Tschantz et al. 2020). In this way, the FEP makes contact
9 Namely, systems able to quantify their expected free-energy; that is, the-free-energy expected under various
courses of action, see (Friston et al. 2013) and (Millidege et al. 2020) for discussion.
8 Saying that active inference corresponds to action (i.e. bodily movements fulfilling an intention) is imprecise.
In fact, each and every self-generated change of sensory state (e.g. sweating to lower one’s bodily temperature)
is an instance of active inference (see Seth and Friston 2016). Here I’m momentarily sacrificing precision to ease
of exposition.
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with one of the core insights of vehicle externalism; namely the claim that often fast and fluid
environmental interactions are the grounds upon which our cognitive successes rest (Clark
2017b).
Here is where Markov Blankets come into play. In statistics and machine learning, MBs
are formal properties of variables in graphical models. Graphical models are sets of nodes
(representing variables) and directed edges connecting nodes (representing causal or
probabilistic relation among variables) used to simplify the computation of complex
probability densities (see Koski and Noble 2009 for an introduction). Within this literature,
MBs are defined as follows:
“Definition 2.20 (Markov Blanket) The Markov Blanket of a variable X is
the set consisting of the parents of X, the children of X and the variables
sharing a child with X. ” (Koski and Noble 2009: 50)10
Here, the parents of a variable X are the variables whose directed connections lead
immediately to X; whereas the children of a variable X are the other variables to which the X
leads immediately through its directed connections; see figure 1.
[Insert figure 1 here]
Figure 1: The Markov Blanket of X. Nodes in the blanket are labelled to simplify the
identification of the parents of X (XP), the children of X (XC) and the variables sharing a child
with X (XS), also known as the co-parents of X. All other nodes are unlabeled (Drawing by the
Author)
The nodes constituting the Markov Blanket of X make it conditionally independent from any
other node in the graph. This means that, in order to optimally estimate the value of X, one
needs only to consider the values of the variables constituting its MB. Knowing (or ignoring)
the value of any other variable will not modify the estimate. This is the reason as to why MBs
can simplify the computation of the value of a variable: they allow us to “throw away” the
rest of the graph X is embedded in when estimating its value. So, for instance, if X is
10 I’m not reporting Pearl’s (1988: 97) original definition for brevity: Pearl defines MBs in terms of further
technical concepts (namely, independency maps) which require explanation in their own right.
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embedded in a graph with a hundred variables but its MB consists only of five variables, one
can safely ignore ninety-five variables in the computation.
Now, the FEP takes MBs to be also real and objective boundaries of living systems (e.g.
Friston 2013; Kirchhoff et al. 2018). As Ramstead and colleagues (2019: 3) put it:11
“The Markov blankets are a result of the system’s dynamics. In a sense, we are
letting the biological systems carve out their own boundaries in applying this
formalism. Hence, we are endorsing a dynamic and self-organising ontology of
systemic boundaries”
The identification of MBs with the boundaries of living systems rests on the idea that
although living systems need to interact with their environment because they are open
systems, they must also distinguish themselves from their environments; that is, their states
must form a set of states that is distinct from the set of environmental states (Palacios et al.
2020).
The FEP cashes in the relevant sense of organism/environment distinction in terms of
conditional independence (Friston 2013; Palacios et al. 2020). The idea is that, once the state
of the organism/environment boundary (i.e. the MB) is fixed, the goings-on on one side of the
boundary will no longer influence the goings-on on the other side. When this happens: “all
the necessary information for explaining the behavior of the internal states is given by the
states of the blanket” (Hohwy 2019: 203). This form of conditional independence is precisely
what MBs bring to the table: they “shield” the blanketed node (or, in the FEP rendition,
organism) from the influence of any other node in the graph (or, in the FEP rendition,
environment).
11 This (as a reviewer noticed) might come as a bit of a shock for readers hostile to the “Pearl Blanket”/”Friston
Blanket” conflation and for readers which are not familiar with the FEP. Both groups of readers are here
reminded of caveats #1 and #2. Sadly, space limitations prevent me from elaborating this point further. But see
(Bruineberg et al. 2020: 16-20) for a clear, detailed and accessible discussion of this issue.
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However, MBs also mediate the causal coupling between organism and environment.12
This is because, according to the FEP, each MB is partitioned into two disjoint sets of states,
termed sensory and active states (e.g. Friston 2013: 2). The partition is roughly as follows: a
state of a MB is a sensory state if it is influenced by external states and influences internal
(and active) states. Conversely, the state is an active state if it is influenced by internal states,
and influences external (and sensory) states. Notice that active and sensory states also
influence each other, in a way that closely resembles perception-action loops (Fabry 2017;
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 67). In this way, MBs allow an agent to couple
sensomotorically with the environment, and allow to further formalize perceptual and active
inference (e.g. Ramstead et al. 2018, fig. 1).
A prototypical example of a MB so conceived is that of a cell’s membrane (Friston 2013;
Da Costa et al. 2021; Millidge et al. 2021). The cell’s membrane is a functionally relevant
boundary which mediates the causal coupling between the cell’s internal states (e.g. the states
of the cytoplasm and organelles) and the external states (i.e. the environment the cell is
embedded in) while still keeping the two separated via the conditional independence it
induces (e.g. if the state of the membrane does not change, then internal states will remain
fixed even if external states change).13
More could be said about the FEP and its explanatory ambitions. But, since here my target
is the role MBs play in the debate over vehicle externalism, I believe this simple sketch is
sufficient for present purposes.
13 Albeit paradigmatic, the example of the cell’s membrane needs some careful handling, for it might suggest that
MBs must, in some sense, be fences; i.e. physical objects having contiguous spatiotemporal parts that demarcate
the perimeter of a spatiotemporal region within which all the constituents of the free-energy minimizing system
are located (see fn. 5). This is not the case: MBs can, but need not, be fences. MBs are primarily functional
boundaries, described as a set of states making two other sets of states (termed “internal” and “external”)
conditionally independent. Whatever satisfies this description is a MB in the relevant sense, whether it is a fence
or not (cfr. Kirchhoff et al. 2018: § 3.1).
12 Notice that this point is not contested, and that it is granted even by vehicle internalists (e.g. Hohwy 2017).
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So, how do MBs bear on the truth of vehicle externalism?
3 - Markov Blankets do not adjudicate whether vehicle externalism is true or not
According to the FEP, MBs are real and objective boundaries of free-energy minimizing
systems, able to formalize perceptual and active inference. Given that perception and action
intuitively are the interfaces separating the thinking machinery from the environment (cfr.
Chalmers 2008; 2019), it is tempting to resort to MBs to determine whether the thinking
machinery includes environmental and/or bodily constituents, thereby determining the truth
of vehicle externalism.
But doing so immediately begs the question against vehicle externalism. This is because,
according to the summary of the FEP presented above, MBs are the boundaries of living
systems such as organisms. Vehicle externalism, however:
“[...] is a view according to which thinking and cognizing may (at times)
depend directly and noninstrumentally upon the work of the body and/or the
extraorganismic environment.” (Clark 2008: XXVIII; emphasis added)
Vehicle externalism claims the constituents of the thinking machinery can be located on either
side of the boundary separating the biological agent from the environment. But, according to
the official presentation of the FEP given above, that boundary just is the MB. So, assuming
without argument that MBs demarcate the thinking machinery simply begs the question
against vehicle externalism.
Perhaps this assumption could be justified by an argument A showing that the boundary of
the organism is also the boundary of the thinking machinery. But then A would show that the
thinking machinery is entirely contained within organisms, thereby proving that vehicle
externalism is false, and leaving no role for MBs to play in adjudicating its truth.
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It could be objected that I just misrepresented MBs, because MBs are multiple and nested
(e.g. Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Hesp et al. 2019). Cells, each with its own MB, sometimes join
forces, constituting multicellular systems that are free-energy minimizers in their own right
(e.g. multicellular organisms), and thus possess their own MB. And in fact, FEP theorists
sometimes claim that we find MBs at every scale of organization, from cells, to tissues and
organs (Friston et al. 2015; Palacios et al. 2020), organisms (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein
2019a), and eventually the entire biosphere (Rubin et al. 2020). Moreover, some of them
claim that MBs are also plastic: their placement can vary over time, as new ways to
sensomotorically engage with the environment are acquired (e.g. Clark 2017a). These shifts
might lead Markov Blankets to move in a way such that their newfound placement includes
organism-external components within the thinking machinery (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein
2019a, 2019b). If these points are correct, then MBs are in no way forced to coincide with the
organism/environment boundary, and can therefore legitimately be used to determine whether
the thinking machinery, or some other system, “extends” (e.g. Hohwy 2016; Ramstead et al.
2019).
The core idea is simple: first, one finds the relevant MB. Then, one looks at what makes up
the internal states. If the internal states encompass only neural components, then vehicle
externalism is false. Otherwise, it is true. This seems the approach Hohwy (2016) adopted:
“[...] there is a quite specific account of what happens in active inference,
which puts part of the boundary at the dorsal horn of the spinal cord. [...] This
tells us how neurocentric we should be: the mind begins where sensory input is
delivered through exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive receptors and
it ends where proprioceptive predictions are delivered, mainly in the spinal
cord.” (Hohwy 2016: 277; emphasis added)
The idea of using MBs in this way is attractive for a number of reasons. As said above,
MBs are taken to be principled boundaries of free-energy minimizing systems. They are said
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to be “achieved by a system through active inference” (Ramstead et al. 2019: 11) and to
“result from a system’s dynamics” (Ramstead et al. 2018:3). For this reason, they seem to
provide a non-arbitrary way to identify systems. Moreover, the identification of MBs seems
to be (at least partially) an empirical matter: in Howhy’s quote above, for instance, the
relevant account of what happens in active inference is the empirical account provided by
(Friston et al. 2010). Thus, MBs seem to promise a principled and empirically sound solution
to the debate over vehicle externalism, providing what many philosophers engaged in that
debate have strived to provide (e.g. Kaplan 2012). Further, MBs appear able to deliver the
desired goods while circumventing the host of thorny philosophical issues that often have
halted the debate over extended cognition, such as issues concerning non-derived content (see
Piredda 2017 for a nice summary).
Yet, it seems to me that this usage of MBs raises at least two distinct problems.
First, the “multiple and nested” view of MBs smuggles a slightly different conception of
MBs into the debate. For, in this conception, MBs are not (or not only) the boundaries of
organisms or living things, but rather the boundaries of biological systems in general.14
Perhaps extending the FEP in this way is the correct thing to do. Yet, once the FEP is
extended in this way, it is no longer clear that perceptual and active inference correspond to
perception and action (or anything thinking machinery-related). The entire biosphere may be
a free-energy minimizing system (Rubin et al. 2020), but it is far from clear whether the
biosphere as a whole perceives and acts.
14 Or even the boundaries of systems in general (e.g. Hipolito 2019; Friston et al. 2020). Notice, however, that
such a reading would transform the FEP from an account of biological self-organization to an account of things
in general, in a way that it is likely to change the status of the FEP as a theoretical object (plausibly, an account
of biological self-organization is a part of a special science, namely biology, whereas an account of things in
general is not). I will not discuss this issue here, as stated by caveat #1.
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Secondly, it is not clear whether letting MBs proliferate in this way would allow them to
play the desired role in determining the truth of vehicle externalism. If MBs really are
multiple and nested within each other, then we would need a criterion C to determine which
MB, in this fractal sea of MBs, bounds the (perhaps extended) thinking machinery. However,
in such a case, whether vehicle externalism is true would be determined by C, rather than the
theoretical appeal to MBs (see also Clark 2017a: 8).
Importantly, the need for such a criterion seems to be acknowledged in the FEP literature.
For instance, Ramstead et al. (2019: 25) argue that we can choose the relevant MB partially
depending on our explanatory interests. Similarly, Allen and Friston (2018: 2466) and Clark
(2017a) inform us that what counts as the relevant MB depends on our explanatory interests.
Even Hohwy (2016) is forced to admit that the choice of what counts as the relevant MB is15
at least partially pragmatic, and that it depends on our explanatory goals. So, it seems that in
the FEP literature I’m considering here, the need of a criterion to “pick up” the relevant MB is
acknowledged, and that such a criterion is provided by our explanatory aims and interests.
However, I think that using such a criterion is problematic for two reasons.
First, if what counts as the relevant MB depends on our explanatory interest, then it
becomes a bit unclear in what sense MBs are ontologically real and objective boundaries that
are the result of a system’s dynamics (e.g. Ramstead et al. 2019). On a fairly intuitive and
innocent reading of “objective”, something is objective if it is not mind-dependent. But surely
explanatory interests are mind-dependent: for there to be explanatory interests, there needs to
be minds around. So, if the MB of a system depends on explanatory interests, then it seems
that MBs are not objective.16
16 Notice that putting things this way does not entail that there is no fact of the matter on which is the relevant
MB: there might still be a fact of the matter about what are the relevant (i.e. MB-determining) explanatory
15 Albeit, in all fairness to Hohwy, he does hold that the MB around the brain is in principle privileged, and thus
it is the one identifying the thinking machinery proper. I will discuss this point below (see section 4)
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Perhaps a way to respond to this challenge is to say that all the various (multiple and
nested) MBs are really and objectively present in a mind-independent way. The idea would be
that of claiming that the ontological structure of biological systems is fractal, and made up of
MBs within MBs (cfr. Kirchhoff et al. 2018). Our explanatory interests would only select one
of these objectively real MBs, singling that one out as the MB bounding the system we are
interested in. If I understand them correctly, Ramstead and colleagues (2019) articulate and
defend precisely such a position.
However, this position makes the second problem emerge perspicuously: the truth of
vehicle externalism does not depend on our explanatory interests and/or our explanatory
practices.
As illustrated in §1, vehicle externalism is a metaphysical thesis concerning the vehicles or
constituents of our thinking machinery, which is independent from epistemic claims
concerning how we should explain its functioning. This is well recognized in the literature
over vehicle externalism (e.g. Sprevak 2010). On the one hand, the fact that vehicle
externalism is a metaphysical claim distinguishes it from embedded/scaffolded views (e.g.
Rupert 2009; Sterelny 2010), according to which satisfactory explanations of how the
thinking machinery functions will make reference to extra-cerebral and/or extra-organismal
factors which are not constituents of the thinking machinery itself. On the other hand, as noted
in the first section of this paper, vehicle externalism makes no claim regarding how the
thinking machinery functions. Vehicle externalism itself is compatible with different
explanatory tools belonging to very different explanatory projects. Explanatory concerns are
thus orthogonal to the truth of vehicle externalism.
interests. Yet, MBs would still not be objective in the sense of being mind-independent.
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The very same point might perhaps most strikingly emerge considering what would
happen given very internalistic explanatory interests. Surely the fact that one’s explanatory
interests concern (for instance) just the hippocampus does not entail that the thinking
machinery is the hippocampus and only the hippocampus (cfr. Clark 2008: 109-110). Hence,
Externalist (or internalist) explanations and/or explanatory interests favoring “wider” (or
“smaller”) MBs do not entitle one to the conclusion that vehicle externalism (or internalism)
is true.17
Now, I wish to point out that there is a sense in which, when it comes to determining
whether vehicle externalism holds true, it is irrelevant whether MBs are boundaries of
organisms rather than multiple and nested. This is because we should be skeptical of the very
idea that MBs can be used to identify systems (thinking machinery included). The reason is
simple: the identification of a system (i.e. of a variable or set of variables of interest) is
logically prior to the identification of its MB. If this is correct, then we are simply not
allowed to use MBs to identify systems, on the pain of circularity.
Notice that this very issue has repeatedly surfaced throughout this section. When it comes
to adjudicating the truth of vehicle externalism via MBs, assuming that MBs “enshroud”
organisms is problematic precisely because it presupposes that the thinking machinery
coincides with the insides of organisms, thereby begging the question against vehicle
externalism. And when it came to “choosing” the right MB in a sea of multiple and nested
MBs, the same problem reappeared: our explanatory interests, presumably oriented towards a
previously identified system (or behavior/phenomenon exhibited by a system), were in fact
17 Reflecting on mental content yields similar results. Most contemporary theories of mental content endorse
semantic externalism, claiming that contents are partially determined by environmental factors (e.g. Shea 2018).
So they accept that the extra-organismal environment plays a role in explaining how the thinking machinery
works; namely, the role of (partially) determining mental contents. But these theories also typically take vehicles
to be internal to the system in which they are tokened. Indeed, that internalism/externalism about content and
vehicle are orthogonal is a fairly uncontested fact (see Clark and Chalmers 1998; Hurley 2010).
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needed to single out the relevant MB. In both cases, we started with a system and then
“discovered” the MB of that specific system.
To see why the identification of a system logically precedes the identification of its MB,
recall how MBs are defined in the relevant literature on graphical models:
“Definition 2.20 (Markov Blanket) The Markov blanket of a variable X is the
set consisting of the parents of X, the children of X and the variables sharing a
child with X. ” (Koski and Noble 2009: 50)
Notice that MBs are defined in terms of the target (blanketed) variable. The definition might
be “expanded” so as to cover more than a variable, thereby capturing all the variables
implicated in a description of a given system of interest. But still, given this definition, one18
first identifies a variable (or set of variables) of interest, and then identifies the relevant MB
of that variable (or set of variables). There is thus no absolute notion of MB: one cannot just
point to a graph and ask: “Ok, now tell me where is the relevant Markov Blanket”. To ask so,
one must have already indicated which is the node whose MB one is interested in. The
identification of the “blanketed” system is logically prior to the identification of its MB. The
direction of identification runs from target variables to MBs, and not the other way around.
Notice that the same order of individuation is preserved in empirical (or semi-empirical)
settings. Consider, for instance, the simulation presented in (Friston 2013). Without entering
too much in the detail, the simulation aims to show that a “protocell” equipped with a MB
will spontaneously emerge from a “primordial soup” of particles interacting through
short-range physical forces. To do so, the “primordial soup” is simulated and the particles are
left to interact for some time. Then, the eight most densely coupled particles are identified as
the internal states (Friston 2013:6), and their MB is recovered and splitted into active and
sensory states (depending on whether the states constituting it influenced or were influenced
18 Alternatively, one could “collapse” all the variables describing a system in the macro-variable “state of the
system”.
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by the internal states). So, it seems that even in the empirical (or semi-empirical) setting of
this simulation, the direction of identification runs from free-energy minimizing systems to
MB.19
Time to take stocks. If MBs are the boundaries of organisms, then using MBs to determine
whether vehicle externalism is true simply begs the question against vehicle externalism. If
MBs are not boundaries of organisms because they are multiple, nested, malleable and plastic,
then using MBs to adjudicate the truth of vehicle externalism does not beg the question
against it - but invites other problems. The first is that it provides a slightly different
conception of MBs, in which perceptual and active inference cannot be obviously equated to
perception and action. The second is that if MBs are multiple and nested, then we need a
criterion to identify which is the MB of the thinking machinery; and it would be that criterion,
rather than the presence of a MB, what adjudicates the truth of vehicle externalism. Moreover,
the criterion currently in use in the FEP literature is problematic, as it casts more than a
shadow of doubt on the objectivity of MBs and it is ultimately unsuited to adjudicate the truth
of vehicle externalism. Lastly, there are reasons to be skeptical of the whole idea of
identifying systems through or by means of their MBs. This is because, logically, the
identification of a MB presupposes the previous identification of a relevant system (i.e. a
variable or set of variables). Using MBs to identify systems would thus be obviously circular.
4 - Markov Blankets do not track the boundaries of the mind
19 In more recent versions of the FEP, however, this is not necessarily true. Thus, for instance, although (Hipolito
et al. 2021) use MBs to partition the nervous system in previously known sub-systems (such as neurons and
canonical microcircuits), (Friston et al. 2021) try to “read” MBs directly out of the couplings of various neuronal
components. Yet, their procedure seems very removed from the graph-theoretic apparatus from which MBs
originated. Moreover, MBs identified through this procedure still seem to be multiple and nested in a way that
invites all the problems discussed above in regard to multiple and nested MBs. At any rate, these versions of the
FEP do not share the assumptions here made via caveats #1 and #2, and so I will not discuss them further.
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In the paragraph above, I’ve put forth some reasons to think that resorting to MBs will not
determine whether vehicle externalism is true or not. But perhaps it could be objected that I
have misunderstood the whole endeavor, and misinterpreted what MBs are supposed to do in
that debate. Maybe MBs are not intended to directly determine the truth-value of vehicle
externalism. Maybe they are just framing tools: conceptual devices that help us, in some
determinate way, to adjudicate whether vehicle externalism is true. Here’s a clear statement of
the idea:
“The Markov Blanket formalism as applied to systems that approximate
Bayesian inference serves as an attractive statistical framework for
demarcating the boundaries of the mind. Unlike other rival candidates for
“marks of the cognitive” the Markov Blanket formalism has the virtue of
avoiding begging the question in the extended mind debate. [...] The Markov
Blanket concept escapes these problems.” (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a:
69-70; emphasis added)
Notice how, in this quote, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein are presenting MBs as a formal tool
with significant epistemic virtues: it avoids begging the question in the debate over vehicle
externalism and escapes some thorny issue that have plagued that debate. Perhaps this is the
correct way to think about the role MBs should play in the debate over vehicle externalism.
Maybe asking “where can we draw a MB around the thinking machinery?” yields more
satisfactory results than trying to find a “mark of the cognitive” (e.g. Adams and Aizawa
2008) or another way to tell apart external propst that causally interact with the thinking
machinery from the ones constituting it (e.g. Kaplan 2012). Since the “classic” debate over
vehicle externalism ended up in a stalemate (cfr. Adams 2019 and the reply by Clark 2019),
new ways to tackle the debate are surely welcome.
Yet, as far as I can see, the idea of using MBs as formal tools to settle the debate over
vehicle externalism is far from unproblematic. In my assessment, it suffers from two distinct
problems.
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The first concerns the ontological status of MBs. In the literature on the FEP I’m
considering, a cell’s membrane is often offered as the prototypical example of a MB (Friston
2013; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; De Costa et al. 2021). But, prima facie, cell membranes are not
framing devices or formal tools: they are concrete objects. Moreover, MBs are supposed to20
be the result of a system free-energy minimizing dynamics (Ramstead et al. 2019). It is hard
to see how a system’s free-energy minimizing activity could result in a formal tool or “an
attractive statistical framework”.21
Now, perhaps the concern above could be allayed just by saying that talking about MBs
(i.e. framing the issue of vehicle externalism in terms of MBs) is a good way of tracking MBs
(i.e. objective boundaries of free-energy minimizing systems, among which the thinking
machinery). The idea would thus be that the MBs talk tracks the objective boundaries of
systems, or that it is at least the best way currently at our disposal to track and identify the
objective boundaries of the thinking machinery (which also happen to be called “Markov
Blankets”, cfr. Palacios et al. 2020: 6). This strikes me as a reasonable and charitable
interpretation of the passage by Kirchhoff and Kiverstein cited above.
Yet, and this is the second concern, there seems no prior guarantee that MBs will track real
and objective boundaries of free-energy minimizing systems. Consider the variables22
implicated in some psychological explanations. The occurrence of depression, for instance, is
correlated with a range of variables such as being divorced, being jobless, having being
22 I owe this observation (and the example) to Anonymized for blind review.
21 Notice that the fact that a cell’s membrane is a fence (see fn. 5 and 13) is playing no role in the argument I just
gave. What is playing a role in my argument is that MBs are supposed to be boundaries objectively “out there” in
the real world, rather than formal tools pertaining to a statistical framework. And, as clarified above, MBs need
not be fences to be objective boundaries “out there”.
20 Of course, this worry is closely linked to worries about the FEP’s status as a theoretical object and its
ontological commitments, as well as the distinction between “Pearl Blankets” and “Friston Blankets”
(Bruineberg et al. 2020; see also Menary and Gillett 2020). But, as amply clarified when making caveats #1 and
#2, I’m here assuming that the version of the FEP I’m considering gets both of them right. And, to restate, the
version of the FEP I’m considering takes MBs as formal tools and MBs as real boundaries of systems to be
identical.
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humiliated (I’m taking this example from Campbell 2007). These variables might figure in a
graph depicting the state of a subject. It is thus possible that they might end up constituting
the MB surrounding the subject’s thinking machinery. Suppose it happens. Then, if the formal
tool provided by MB tracks the real and objective boundaries of the thinking machinery, it
would follow that being divorced or being jobless are part of the objective boundary that
functionally separates the subject’s thinking machinery for the environment, which is
established by the free-energy minimizing activity of the thinking machinery itself. I must
confess that I find this claim simply unintelligible. And yet it is a claim that could be licensed
by the assumption that MBs track the objective boundaries of systems. Generalizing from this
example, the problem seems to be this: given a target variable (or set of variables) in a graph,
the MB that the target variable (or set of variables) identifies may be composed of nodes that
track things or states of affairs that might not constitute an ontologically real and objective
boundary in any straightforward sense of the term.23
It could be objected that although such “weird” boundaries could be identified, nothing
entails that they will. The fact that we have no prior guarantees that Markov Blankets will
track the real and objective boundaries of the thinking machinery clearly does not entail that
they won’t track it. Perhaps, as a matter of contingent fact, they will. The proof is in the
pudding.
However, observing how MBs have been used strongly suggests that they do not in fact
track the objective and real boundaries of the thinking machinery. To be fair, I must state here
that it has not forced us to say that being jobless is part of the boundary separating the
thinking machinery from the rest of the world (at least, not yet). Nevertheless, MBs seem to
23 Notice, for the sake of clarity, that the problem I’m raising here is not that such a blanket would not be a fence
(see fn. 5 and 13). Nor the problem that I’m here raising is that variables such as “having been humiliated” do
not map onto spatiotemporal parts of fences. The problem I’m raising is that such variables do not seem to map
onto any functional boundary constituting a thinking machinery/world interface.
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misplace such a boundary in a way significant enough to make the whole MB-based approach
to vehicle externalism worth reconsidering.
To see why, consider two prominent MB-based approaches to the debate over vehicle
externalism. One is Hohwy’s (2016; 2017) defense of vehicle internalism; the other is
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s (2019a; 2019b) defense of vehicle externalism.24
Importantly, both approaches use MBs to frame the debate over vehicle externalism in
roughly the same way. Both approaches take MBs to be “multiple and nested” (Hohwy 2016:
264; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 73-76). As a consequence, both accounts resort to MBs
to frame the vehicle internalism/externalism debate in terms of which MB should be chosen to
track the bounds of the thinking machinery, and why that specific MB should be preferred
over all the other MBs (e.g. Hohwy 2016: 265; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 79-80). Both
accounts agree on the fact that the choice of the relevant MB must be justified using only
theoretical resources internal to the FEP. In a sense, thus, both accounts agree upon the fact
that, if properly interrogated, the FEP will tell us where the thinking machinery stops and the
rest of the world begins (Hohwy 2016: 267-273; 2017: 2-4; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a:
79-81; 2019b: 17-18). Importantly, both accounts agree upon a clear MB-based criterion to
identify the boundaries of the mind; namely, that the relevant MB is the MB that identifies the
internal states that minimize surprisal over time, or on average and in the long run. Here’s25
Hohwy spelling it out:
25 Notice that this criterion identifies the relevant MB by what it bounds; namely, the physical machinery that
performs free-energy minimization on average and in the long run. Hence it is fully consistent with the
arguments provided in the end of the preceding section of this paper.
24 The choice of Hohwy’s account as a representative account of the internalist front is somewhat forced by the
fact that other philosophers defending forms of internalism (broadly speaking) about predictive processing/the
FEP do not defend vehicle internalism directly (e.g. Gładziejewski 2017; Wiese 2018). The choice of Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein as representatives of the vehicle externalist front is less forced, but still pretty much obliged:
Clark (2017a; 2017b) is more concerned with predictive processing rather than the FEP. And (Ramstead et al.
2019) seem to believe that the choice of considering “extended” systems depends purely on our explanatory
interests; a position that can be squared with an embedded, but still vehicle internalist, view (Rupert 2009;
Sterenly 2010).
USELESS BLANKETS 22/45
“Another, somewhat more principled response [...] is to rank agents according
to their overall, long term prediction error minimization (or free-energy
minimization): the agent worthy of explanatory focus is the system that in the
long run is best at revisiting a limited (but not too small) set of states. It is most
plausible that such a minimal entropy system is constituted by the nervous
system of what we normally identify as a biological organism: [...] extended
agents do not maintain low entropy in the long run” (Hohwy 2016: 265;
emphasis added)
where an “agent” is just a system surrounded by a MB. Here’s Kirchhoff and Kiverstein
making essentially the same point:
“The self-evidencing nature of biological agents blocks the threat from
cognitive bloat. External resources form part of an agent’s mind when they are
poised to play a part in the process of active inference that keeps surprisal at
minimum over time. [...] More generally we suggest an external resource will
count as a part of an individual’s mind if it is a part of a system whose
existence is produced and maintained through a self-evidencing process”
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019b: 17-18)
Recall that such an “over time, on average and in the long run” criterion is intrinsic in the
structure of the FEP. The FEP is an account of how organisms/biological systems persist over
time. According to the FEP, biological systems persist through time by minimizing entropy,
that is, surprisal on average. And since surprisal is the complement of model evidence, this
means that organisms are self-evidencing systems; that is, systems that, over time, seek the
evidence confirming their existence, thereby prolonging it (cfr. Hohwy 2016).
Lastly, and most crucially for present purposes, both accounts take the “over time, on
average and in the long run” criterion to be extensionally adequate; that is, apt to single out
the MBs tracking the boundary enshrouding all and only the cogs of the thinking machinery.
This is because the criterion is used to solve two deeply related problems concerning the way
in which the boundaries of the thinking machinery are drawn; namely the “cognitive bloat”
objection to vehicle externalism (i.e. too much stuff gets counted as a cog in the thinking
machinery) and the “shrinking brain” objection to vehicle internalism (i.e. too little stuff gets
counted as a cog, see Anderson 2017) at once.
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The number of premises shared by the accounts proposed by Kirchhoff, Kiverstein and
Hohwy immediately invites the following question: if the premises are the same, then why do
the conclusions differ? If they all espouse the same premises and the same relevant criterion
to identify the thinking machinery, their conclusions should be the same. So, apparently,
either Hohwy or Kirchhoff and Kiverstein mis-applied the criterion. This seems to suggest
that framing the debate over vehicle externalism in terms of MBs does not, in and by itself,
simplify our tracking the boundaries of the thinking machinery. Now, one might object that
framing that debate in terms of MBs is not supposed, in and of itself, to simplify our tracking.
Fair enough; but then, why bother with MBs? What sort of theoretical boon are MBs
providing here? I am inclined to answer “none”. In fact, I believe that the criterion Hohwy,
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein derive from the FEP is grossly extensionally inadequate.
To see why, recall that, during active inference, an agent “brings about” the sensory states
it expects to encounter. Importantly, these states encompass the variables that define the
state-space of all of an organism’s possible states. For us humans (and, broadly speaking,
animals) this includes extero-, intero- and viscero-ceptive states (e.g. Seth and Friston 2016).
Hence, us humans (and animals in general) must minimize free-energy in respect to all these
states.
Consider now the following, often used, example (e.g. Bruineberg 2018: 3; Bruineberg et
al. 2018: 2423; Ramstead et al. 2019: 9, Veissière et al. 2020): human beings expect their
bodily temperature to be around 36.6°. For a human, having a bodily temperature around
36.6° is the least surprisaling state; and deviations from that state, whether they increase or
decrease the bodily temperature, increase surprisal. So, when our bodily temperature deviates
from the predicted 36.6°, we engage in active inference, to minimize free-energy and avoid
surprisal. We do so, for instance, by sweating, so as to lower our bodily temperature when it is
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too high; or by trembling, so as to raise it when it is too low. We also keep our bodily
temperature around 36.6° by wearing appropriate clothes. And clothes appear to be part of
the physical machinery by means of which we minimize free-energy, and thus avoid surprisal
over time, on average and in the long run: we wear clothes more often than not, and we surely
wear them with the purpose of keeping our bodily temperature around 36.6°. It thus seems
correct to conclude that, according to Kirchhoff, Kiverstein and Hohwy’s criterion, the
relevant MB tracking the bounds of the thinking machinery will include clothes in the internal
states. And this conclusion surely seems wrong: pretty much everyone agrees that the
constituents of our thinking machinery are supposed to do something with information, either
by processing and/or storing it (as cognitivists contend), by “resonating” with it (as
gibsonians contend, see Raja 2018) or by responding to it and/or enabling an agent’s response
to it (as enactivists contend, see Hutto and Myin 2013). But clothes do not appear to do
anything with information. So, it seems correct to conclude that the proposed criterion is not
extensionally adequate: it counts too much stuff as a cog in the thinking machinery.
Notice that the argument I’ve just given does not depend on a very demanding
“benchmark” to adjudicate whether something counts as a constituent of the thinking
machinery (cfr. Wheeler 2011). As Wheeler notices, when determining whether a candidate26
constituent really qualifies as a constituent of the thinking machinery, we need to have some
benchmark to determine whether the constituent contributes to thinking (in the broadest
possible sense) as opposed to anything else - otherwise, every candidate constituent would be
counted in by default! Traditionally, this benchmark is provided by the mark of the cognitive
one endorses; that is, by what one (implicitly or implicitly) takes to be necessary and/or
sufficient to make something a genuine contributor to thinking (in the broadest possible27
27 In the literature, sets of either necessary (e.g. Adams and Aizawa 2008) or sufficient (Rowlands 2009)
26 I wish to thank a reviewer for having pressed me to make this point more explicit.
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sense). Here, the “mark of the cognitive” I’m endorsing is not very demanding and does not28
rest on contentious assumptions on the nature of cognition (indeed, as highlighted above,
ecological psychologists, enactivists and cognitivists can all easily endorse it). In the present29
context, this is a virtue: it makes my “benchmarking” fairly uncontroversial, thereby making
this “mark of the cognitive” very hard to reject, in a way that makes it hard to reject my
conclusion by rejecting the “mark of the cognitive” on which it rests.30
A reviewer (whom I thank) noticed that the example provided above can be countered in
this way: clothes keeps our free-energy low on average and in the long run only considered as
a type, but no token piece of clothing is involved in free-energy minimization on average and
in the long run - we change clothes far to often for that to be the case. Hence no token piece
of clothing should be included in the thinking machinery. This remark is surely correct. And
yet, the example can be easily modified so as to force the inclusion of token pieces of clothing
in the thinking machinery. We can easily imagine a futuristic society in which clothes are
30 And even if someone were to take issue with this “mark of the cognitive”, I could still do without it by
appealing to our folksy intuitions to substantiate my conclusion: I’m fairly sure no one has the intuition that
clothes are part of our thinking machinery. Notice that such an appeal to intuition would not be something
groundbreaking in the debate over vehicle externalism: indeed, it is what (Clark 2008) recommends. Notice
further that for such an appeal to intuition to work I neither need to presuppose that our intuitions are always
crisp and clear, nor I need to presuppose that such intuitions are universally shared or indefeasible. There surely
are cases in which our intuitions on cognition are murky, defeasible and not universally shared (e.g. do bacteria
cognize?, see Lyons 2015). But the case at hand does not seem one of such cases.
29 Notice the scare quotes: I do not mean to suggest that “doing something with information” is the real mark of
the cognitive. I’m only using it as a mark of the cognitive for argumentative purposes. And this to me seems
fairly justified given that most philosophers and cognitive scientists would take “doing something with
information” to be at least necessary in order for something to qualify as a cog in a cognitive machinery. Notice
further that the “mark of the cognitive” I’m here adopting makes no distinction between mere sensing and real
thought. So one cannot object to my analysis that it begs the question against alleged instances of “extended
sensing”, such as the usage of sensory substitution devices ranging from tactile-visual substitution devices (cfr.
Noe 2004) to the proverbial stick of a blind person (Merleau-Ponty 2013).
28 For the sake of completeness, notice that, strictly speaking, a mark of the cognitive may not be necessary to
determine what counts as a cog in the thinking machinery. For example, Kaplan (2012) has proposed a mutual
manipulability criterion to do that, and that criterion does not qualify as a mark of the cognitive. Notice,
however, that if one were to endorse Kaplan’s criterion to identify the various bits and pieces of the cognitive
machinery, one would not have any use for MBs in determining the boundaries of the mind.
conditions have been proposed - but no set of necessary and sufficient conditions. I think this disparity depends
on one’s argumentative goals: defenders of vehicle externalism have only to show that some external component
really qualifies as a constituent of the thinking machinery, and to do so they only need sufficient conditions.
Conversely, vehicle internalists need to argue that no candidate constituent really qualifies as a constituent:
hence, they typically need to show us that all plausible candidate constituents violate some necessary condition.
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made out using a super resistant, self-cleaning fiber, and so everyone wears a single outfit for
the entirety of one’s life. And even letting aside sci-fi scenarios, our livers do contribute to
our thermoregulation. And most of us have only a single token liver through their lifetime.
Should we conclude our livers are cogs in our thinking machinery? I’d answer in the negative,
adducing the same reasons I adduced to claim that clothes are not cogs in our thinking
machinery. Notice further that counterexamples of this sort proliferate easily. We typically
have a single token pair of lungs and kidneys, a single stomach, a single intestine, a single set
of blood vessels, a single hearth, and so forth. All these organs and body parts perform a
number of functions that keep our free-energy low. And they perform these functions on
average and in the long run. But, plausibly, none of these organs counts as a cog in our
thinking machinery.
A (different) reviewer objected that the original clothes example rests on a philosophical
sleight of hand. In their view, I build up the scenario using clothes, whereas I should use
“knowing to take action to put on/take off/change clothes” (verbatim quote). Clothes, the
reviewer seems to suggest, only contribute to a subject’s sensory states. But sensory states are
fleeting. This, the reviewer suggests, makes the case I proposed significantly different from
paradigmatic cases of extended cognition, such as Otto’s usage of a notebook to remember a
relevant piece of information (Clark and Chalmers 1998). In this case, memory is not treated
as something fleeting, and it is its persistence that makes Otto’s perceptuomotor access to the
notebook count as a bona fide instance of extended cognition. What could be said in
response?
I’m not sure, mainly because I’m not sure I understand what the reviewer is after. I have a31
31 For the record, this means that I could have grossly misinterpreted the reviewer’s point, and thus that the
paragraph above might be a gross misrepresentation of the reviewer’s actual position. If that is the case, I
apologize: it is not my intention to misrepresent the reviewer’s view. But that is what I’ve understood, and so I
can only respond to that.
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hard time seeing why, in the example above, clothes should be substituted by one's knowledge
about which clothes one should wear. I’m willing to concede that the vehicle storing that
piece of knowledge is a bona fide cog in a subject’s thinking machinery, and I’m willing to
concede that it plays a role in keeping one’s free-energy low on average and in the long run.
Trivially, if one thinks that a good way to resist cold temperatures is by getting naked, one’s
free-energy will increase. But surely that piece of knowledge alone is not sufficient to keep
one’s free-energy low. I might know that, given the cold temperature, I would be better off
wearing a sweater. But if I have no sweater to wear, I will get cold, thereby failing to
efficiently minimize my free-energy. So, there seems to be nothing problematic in taking32
clothes to be parts of the physical machinery by means of which free-energy is minimized;
hence, at least in this regard, I’ve performed no sleight of hand. And this seems all that is
needed in order for my original example to work.33
Now, back to the main argument. I want to make a further claim. I want to argue that even
if we set aside (for the sake of discussion) matters of extensional adequacy, we have a further
reason not to endorse that “on average, in the long run” criterion. For it seems that when it
comes to internal (i.e. neural) vehicles, we do not judge whether they qualify as constituents
of the thinking machinery based on their role in free-energy minimization on average and in
the long run. Hence, that criterion violates the core insight that the “parity principle” is34
34 A reviewer noticed that the original formulation formulation of the parity principle embeds a temporal
dimension: “if, as we confront some task, part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in the
head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for
that time) part of the cognitive process (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 8, emphasis added). The reviewer's comment
is surely welcome, for it reinforces my point: if we follow the parity principle, we judge candidate constituents of
the thinking machinery by how they contribute to cognitive processing when they contribute, rather than by the
overall duration of their contribution. Hence a criterion based on “average, in the long run” contribution to
33 Moreover, I must confess that I find it hard to see why the fleetiness of sensory states (as opposed to the
persistence of memory) might cause troubles here. Although Otto’s case is (perhaps regrettably) one of the
paradigmatic cases of extended cognition, and although in that case surely what “extends” (if anything) is a
perduring dispositional state, vehicle externalism is in no way a claim whose scope is limited to perduring states.
Indeed, the first case of cognitive extension proposed in (Clark and Chalmers 1998) is a case of extended mental
rotation, entirely built upon the usage of fleeting sensory states.
32 Bruineberg et al. (2018a: 2430-2432) make a very similar point.
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trying to express; namely, that we should judge whether candidate external vehicles are
constituents of our thinking machinery with the same metric we deploy to judge internal
vehicles (Clark 2008; 77-78; 2013: 195).35
Consider the following scenario: after a severe head injury, a child gets a part of her brain x
explanted at time t. After the surgery, she recovers and goes on to live a long (and cognitive
unimpaired) life. It seems intuitively correct to say that, after t, the neural region x does not
count as a cog in her thinking machinery. But it seems equally intuitively correct to say that,
before t, the neural region x actually was a cog in her thinking machinery. That is, at time t-136
it seems intuitively correct to judge x a cog in the thinking machinery. And, more importantly,
it seems unlikely that, at t-1, we would revise such a verdict, were we to discover that, due to
an historical accident, x will not partake in free-energy minimization on average and in the
long run (by stipulation, since “the owner” of x is a child, she spends most of her life without
x). In other words, it seems correct to say that, when x is appropriately wired, it just is a cog
in the thinking machinery, regardless of what its future career as a piece of a free-energy
minimizing engine will be. The fact that a putative piece (neural or non-neural) of the
thinking machinery can be contingently decoupled from the rest of that machinery by some
future event “does not rule out cognitive status”, as Clark and Chalmers (1998: 11) wrote.
Notice further that, albeit in less extreme form, many purely neural “candidate cogs” of
our thinking machinery do not end up performing free-energy minimization on average and in
36 There is, to be sure, a call to intuition here. But I think it is fine, as, at the end of the day, determining what
really qualifies as a cog in the mental machinery is based on our intuitions about what counts as cognitive (see
Clark 2010: 53-54; 2019: 277); at least, until a suitably uncontested “mark of the mental/cognitive” is provided.
But notice that the minimal “mark of the cognitive” deployed above licenses this conclusion too.
35 Vehicle externalists that emphasize the complementarity of inner and outer resources (e.g. Menary 2007; 2018)
find the parity principle problematic, as it might suggest that internal and external resources must be functionally
similar. Yet,even vehicle externalists stressing complementarity agree on the fact that whether a putative vehicle
counts as a cog in the mental machinery depends exclusively on the sort of task it performs in the relevant sort of
processing in which it takes part, regardless of its spatial location. Thus, they agree with the parity principle as
stated in the main text (cfr. Menary 2007: 55-57; Gallagher 2018).
free-energy minimization is surely at odds with the parity principle. And that is what I’m claiming.
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the long run. Consider, for instance, synaptic pruning. According to the FEP, such a process
should be understood in terms of a reduction of model parameters, bolstering neuronal
efficiency (Friston 2010: 131). But such a description of synaptic pruning makes sense only if
we concede that the “pruned” synapses were parameters of the model seeking evidence for
itself. Yet, synaptic pruning is a process that naturally happens during development (e.g.
Changeaux 1985), when one is still a child. Hence it seems that we are committed to the
claim that the relevant model (i.e. the internal states enshrouded by a MB) has genuine
constituents which are not there in the long run, and thus cannot contribute to long-term error
minimization. Moreover, a neuronal region might fail to perform its own free-energy
minimization duties in the long run without having to physically “leave the brain”, for
instance as a result of a disconnection syndrome (see Parr and Friston 2020). Yet, it seems
correct to say that such a neural region is still a cog in the thinking machinery - indeed, it is
only because such a cog is damaged that we can account for the symptoms brought about by
the disconnection syndrome. Lastly, under normal conditions, neural regions organize in
“transient” task specific neuronal devices (see Anderson 2014; Clark 2017b for a “predictive”
take on the issue). But it is far from clear whether any such transiently created device
performs free-energy minimization in the long run. Yet it seems intuitively correct to count
them as cogs in the thinking machinery nevertheless.
Now, if all of this is true for neural candidate vehicles and the parity principle is correct ,37
then the same must hold for putative external vehicles. Hence, given that we would not apply
the “over time, on average and in the long run” criterion to pieces of the brain, we should not
37 Of course, one could provide an argument against the parity principle and counter this argument. But such an
argument would effectively be a refutation of vehicle externalism, and so it would solve the vehicle externalism
debate (in favor of vehicle internalism), leaving MBs no role to play in it.
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apply it to putative external vehicles. And since (at least intuitively) the antecedent is correct,
the consequent follows.
A reviewer suggested that the line of reasoning proposed above might be tainted by a
conceptual confusion; that is, a confusion between supporting the existence of a free-energy
minimizing system in the long run and being part of or constituting a free-energy minimizing
system in the long run. The example the reviewer provided is the following: a
neurotransmitter token (say, a particular serotonin molecule) can support the continued
existence of a free-energy minimizing system without thereby being part of the system’s
continued existence: given neurotransmitter decay, that particular molecule will not be part of
the system’s future states. Now, if what matters is just supporting the continued existence of a
system, then my thought experiment on child neural explant (and the subsequent points on
synaptic pruning, disconnection syndromes and “transient” task-specific neuronal devices)
would not be warranted.
While it is true that these points would not be warranted if what matters is just supporting
a free-energy minimizing system continued existence, it is doubtful that what matters is just
supporting. Conceptually, were just supporting an organism’s continued free-energy
minimization sufficient for being part of the thinking machinery, then all sorts of things would
count as constituents of that machinery. For example, if I’m on fire and jump in a pond of
water to put off the flames, that water is transiently supporting my continued existence. But it
seems wrong to say that ponds of water are constituents of my thinking machinery, for the
same reason it seems wrong to say that clothes are constituents of my thinking machinery:
they do not do anything with information. Moreover, as a matter of interpretation, both
Hohwy and Kirchhoff and Kiverstein seem to agree that just transiently supporting a
free-energy minimizing system’s prolonged existence is not enough:
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“It is crucial that this minimization happens on average and in the long run
because the surprise that is sought minimized is defined in terms of the states
the creature tends to occupy in the long run [...]. Whereas prediction error can
be minimized transiently by systems with all sorts of objects included (e.g.,
shooting the tiger with a gun), on average and over the long run, it is most
likely that the model providing evidence for itself is just the traditional,
un-extended biological organism.” (Hohwy 2016: 271 emphasis added)
“The action of using the notebook is a part of how Otto succeeds in minimising
expected free-energy [...] Crucially, his use of the notebook is not simply a
one-off action. It is part of how Otto minimises expected free-energy, on
average and over time.” (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019b: 17-18; emphasis
added)
So, it seems correct to say that the point I just raised does not misinterpret Kirchhoff,
Kiverstein or Hohwy’s thoughts on the matter.
Now, it is natural to wonder whether the “over time, on average and in the long run”
criterion to identify the MB around the thinking machinery could be substituted by a better
criterion. However, the “over time, on average and in the long run” criterion is taken to
directly “fall off” out of the FEP. And, in fact, both Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a: 80-81;
2019b 17-18) and Hohwy (2016: 272) derive it directly by the self-evidencing nature of living
systems, for self-evidencing just is minimizing free-energy over time, on average and in the
long run (e.g. Friston 2013; Friston et al. 2020). Hence, if this is correct, there seems to be no
easy way to displace the “over time, on average and in the long run” criterion without thereby
introducing substantial modifications in the theoretical architecture of the FEP itself.
Perhaps the “over time, on average and in the long run” criterion could be complemented
by some further criterion, ensuring that the relevant thinking machinery is identified in an
extensionally adequate way. But that seems like an admission of defeat: such a criterion
would in fact be in the task of correcting the verdicts yielded by the “over time, on average
and in the long run” criterion, which strongly suggest that the “over time, on average and in
the long run”, in spite of being intrinsic to the FEP, is not up to the task.
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But perhaps I’ve thus far dramatically misunderstood what “on average, in the long run”
means; or so, at least, a reviewer contends. They argue that when, in the infantile
neurosurgery example, I wrote “[...]by stipulation, since ‘the owner’ of x [NA:the
neurosurgically removed region] is a child, she spends most of her life without x” the phrase
“most of her life” was exactly what it is meant by the expression “on average, in the long
run”. The reviewer further argues that getting the meaning of that expression right is crucial
for my argument, given that my entire argument turns on a distinction between statistical and
physical boundaries. To help make this distinction clear, the reviewer proposes the following
example: if one colours inside the lines on average and in the long run, one might be actually
coloring outside the lines at any point in time. But, as the appropriate frequencies are taken
into account, even the act of coloring outside the lines is part of one’s coloring inside the line
on average and in the long run. How could I respond?
To start, I wish to note that my argument does not turn out to depend on a distinction
between statistical and physical boundaries. I indicated this explicitly in §1. In that section,
I’ve explicitly stated that, for the purposes of the present argument, I was not going to
distinguish between “Pearl Blankets”, that is, Markov Blankets intended as formal properties
of variables, and “Friston Blankets”, that is, Markov Blankets intended as ontologically real
boundaries of a system. This is also why, in the same section, I’ve explicitly stated that my
claim here is conditional: it is conditional because I’m willingly not distinguishing the two (as
commonly done in the literature) for the sake of argument.38
38 Perhaps there is a sense in which my argument presupposes a distinction between statistical and physical
boundaries, if by “physical boundaries” one means what I have here been indicating with the term “fences”; that
is, a physical object having contiguous spatiotemporal parts which demarcate the perimeter of the spatiotemporal
region within which all and only the constituents of the free-energy minimizing system are located (see fn. 5).
But surely distinguishing statistical boundaries such as MBs from fences is not problematic, given that MBs are
not supposed to be fences (see fn. 13). Distinguishing the boundaries of the thinking machinery from fences is
similarly unproblematic, given that no one takes such boundaries to be fences. Otherwise, it would be fairly easy
to argue against vehicle externalism: it would be sufficient to notice that no “extended fence” exists!
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Let me now focus on the example of coloring within the lines. If I interpret it correctly, the
example suggests that a process (coloring within the lines) going on on average and in the
long run need not be constituted (or otherwise made up) by spatiotemporal parts occurring (or
otherwise present) on average and in the long run (if the coloring outside the lines were to
occur on average and in the long run, then arguably one wouldn’t be coloring inside the lines
on average and in the long run).
If the example is meant to convey this, then the reviewer is raising a point similar to the
point examined above when I contrasted supporting and being part of the continued existence
of a free-energy minimizing system. Lots of things (like jumping into ponds of water to put
off flames) can be transient parts of the process of minimizing one’s free-energy on average
and in the long run. It is even possible to conceive realistic scenarios in which one’s
deliberate departure from low-surprisal states is part of one’s in the long run free-energy
minimization (e.g. skipping breakfast to take a blood test). But surely ponds of water and
skipped breakfasts are not cogs in the cognitive machinery - they do not do anything with
information.
One could perhaps contend these uncomfortable conclusions seemingly follow only
because I’ve not changed my interpretation of the “on average, in the long run” phrase. But
how should it be interpreted?
The reviewer suggests that “on average, in the long run” means roughly “most of a
system’s lifetime”. But this is how the phrase has been interpreted above. Indeed, the infantile
neurosurgery case works precisely because some extremely plausible cogs of the child’s
thinking machinery are not there for most of her life, and so, given Kirchhoff, Kiverstein and
Hohwy’s usage of MBs to demarcate the boundaries of the thinking machinery, we are pushed
towards the (seemingly unwarranted) conclusion that these very plausible cogs (recall, in the
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examples they are pieces of neural tissue!) are not cogs at all. Hence, it seems that all my
points/counterexamples are left in good order by such a reading.
Perhaps it could be argued that the expression “on average, in the long run” names the
system’s phenotype; that is, the set of low-surprisal states that according to the FEP an
organism must visit on average and in the long run in order to prolong its existence. If that
were the case, the claim made by Hohwy, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein would be that something
counts as a constituent in a subject’s thinking machinery just in case it contributes to the
organism’s occupying the phenotypic states.
But this does not seem what they want to claim (see their citations above). They manifestly
do not wish to call a constituent of the thinking machinery everything that contributes to a
system’s persistent occupation of its phenotypic states. Otherwise, why shouldn’t Hohwy
allow guns used to shoot tigers (his example) to count? And why would Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein stress the fact that Otto’s usage of his notebook is not a one-off action? Surely the
one-off action of shooting a tiger to avoid being mauled to death does contribute towards one
occupying one’s phenotypic states.
One might perhaps contend further that Kirchhoff, Kiverstein and Hohwy are simply
misguided, and that the reading above is the one they should have endorsed. I really do not
see how such a view could be defended. After all, Kirhhoff, Kiverstein and Hohwy do not
endorse that reading precisely because they realize endorsing it would force one to count an
inordinate amount of stuff as a cog in someone’s thinking machinery: jumping into ponds of
water while on fire or shooting at a tiger to avoid becoming the tiger’s dinner both contribute
to one’s prolonged occupation of one’s phenotypic states, but neither ponds of water nor guns
and bullets can be properly counted as cogs in the thinking machinery (they do not appear to
do anything with information). Moreover, there can be very plausible cogs in one’s thinking
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machinery that do not contribute to one’s continuous occupation of one’s phenotypic states.
Think about the patterns of neural activity that instantiate a person's suicidal (or otherwise
self-harming) tendencies.
In summary, it seems to me entirely correct to conclude that such an alternative reading of
the phrase “on average, in the long run” is not supported by textual evidence, and it is not able
to solve the relevant issue at hand. Hence, it should be rejected. Notice, importantly, that
nothing of what I’ve just said entails or suggests that the reading of “on average, in the long
run” deployed in my main argument is the correct reading. Nor am I entailing or suggesting
that it is the only possible or coherent reading. Other readings might be both possible and
more apt. But, at present, I really am unable to see any such alternative reading. So, I’m
happy to throw the ball in the other camp, challenging philosophers convinced that MBs do a
good job at tracking the boundaries of the mind to spell out, in a clear manner, such an
alternative reading.
Time to take stocks. In this section, I have argued that considering MBs as formal tools to
identify the boundaries of the thinking machinery raises a puzzle on the metaphysical status
of MBs. Even ignoring that puzzle, considering MBs as formal tools to track the boundaries
of the thinking machinery does not guarantee us that MBs will identify boundaries in any
relevant sense, and indeed the concrete application of such a tool has thus far yielded very
unpalatable results.
This strongly suggests that MBs are not good formal tools to track the boundaries of the
thinking machinery. In the next section I will further expand on this issue, suggesting that
resorting to MBs forces us to sidestep the dispute over vehicle externalism in a very important
sense.
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5 - Is vehicle externalism (conditioned over Markov Blankets) possible?
In this section, I want to argue that resorting to MBs to settle the debate over vehicle
externalism leads us to sidestep the whole debate in a very real sense, making vehicle
internalism vacuously true. My argument hinges on two premises.
The first premise is that the relevant meaning of “external(-ism)” and “internal(-ism)” is
defined in terms of MBs, as seen in section 2. Recall: according to the FEP, what counts as
internal and external depends on the presence of some relevant MB. This premise is widely
shared in the FEP literature (e.g. Friston 2013; Wiese 2018: 223-227; Kirchhoff et al. 2018).
Hohwy spells it the most clearly:
“It is tempting to say that any account of perception and cognition that operates
with internal models must in some sense be internalist. But the natural next
question is what makes internal models internal? [...] A better answer is
provided by the notion of Markov Blankets and self-evidencing through
approximation to Bayesian inference. Here is a principled distinction between
the internal, known causes as they are identified by the model, and the
external, hidden causes on the other side of the Markov Blanket.” (Hohwy
2017: 6-7, emphasis added)
It seems to me there isn’t much more to say: the meaning of “internal(-ism)” and
“external(-ism)” is determined by the relevant MB (see also Ramstead et al. 2019).
The second premise is that we should identify the thinking machinery by means of MBs.
Again, this is a premise widely shared in the literature over “predictive” vehicle externalism. I
think the references given in the previous sections substantiate this claim enough.
But then, if the thinking machinery is enshrouded by an MB, and if what is enshrouded by
an MB is by definition internal in the relevant sense, then all the vehicles of the thinking
machinery are by definition internal, vehicle internalism is by definition true, and everyone
engaged in the debate over predictive vehicle externalism is by definition a vehicle internalist.
In the continuation of the passage cited above Jakob Hohwy almost noticed the issue:
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“This seems a clear way to define internalism as a view of the mind according
to which perceptual and cognitive processing all happen within the internal
model, or, equivalently, within the Markov Blanket. This is then what
non-internalist views must deny. [...] Notice that this definition of internalism
makes Clark an internalist” (Hohwy 2017: 6-7, emphasis added)
But if this is the case, then we should reject the proposed definition of “internal(ism)” and
“external(ism)”. We wish that our relevant definitions capture at least paradigmatic instances
of what is being defined. Hence, our relevant definition of “(vehicle) externalism” should
capture at least paradigmatic instances of vehicle externalism; and the works of Andy Clark
surely are one such instance. Hence, it seems correct to conclude that if MBs provide us with
a partition between internal and external, then that partition is not the relevant partition at
issue in the debate over vehicle externalism.
My argument has two premises. A good way to resist it is to deny one of them. Can
premise one be denied? Well, the first premise is just that “internal” and “external” should be
defined in reference to MBs. We can surely deny this, but this invites the question: if MBs do
not decide what counts as internal or external, then why are they relevant to the vehicle
externalism debate? Moreover, denying that MBs define what counts as internal and external
seems in stark contrast with the FEP. So, I do not think the FEP theorist is free to deny
premise one.
Does denying premise two lead to a better outcome? Well, since premise two is the claim
that the thinking machinery should be identified by means of MBs, denying it seems just to
give up on MBs, at least when it comes to drawing the boundaries of the thinking machinery.
Perhaps it could be argued that premise one and premise two are fine, and that vehicle
internalists have won the debate via MBs. As far as I can see this is a technically viable move,
but not an attractive one; not even for vehicle internalists. In fact, accepting both premises
makes vehicle externalism false by definition. But the point of vehicle internalists has never
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been that vehicle externalism is false by definition - rather, their point is that vehicle
externalism is false as a matter of contingent empirical fact (cfr. Adams and Aizawa 2008).
The truth of vehicle externalism should thus at least in part depend on how the world
factually is, and souldn’t be entirely settled by the meaning of words. Accepting that the
dispute over vehicle externalism is solved by a re-definition of “internalism” and
“externalism” seems a significant change of topic.
Moreover, I doubt such a redefinition of “internalism” would buy the internalist something
more than a purely verbal victory. For there would still be a clash among internalists who
believe that internal states are purely neural and internalists who believe that, at least
sometimes, the internal states are not purely neural. It thus seems that accepting both premises
does make vehicle internalism vacuously true. For, it seems that, thus secured, the truth of
vehicle internalism has no relevant consequence - apart from forcing us to refer to vehicle
externalism as “vehicle internalism”, in a confusing way.
I thus recommend abandoning at least one of the two premises above. Given that
abandoning premise one runs counter to the FEP, I believe the FEP theorist is better off giving
up premise two; that is, I believe the FEP theorist should acknowledge that MBs do not
matter in the debate over vehicle externalism.
6 - Concluding remarks
I have argued that MBs are not relevant to the debate over vehicle externalism. If the
arguments I’ve provided here are on the right track, MBs do not solve, nor help to solve, the
debate surrounding “the extended mind”.
Importantly, I do not take my arguments to be “knockdown” arguments. I’m willing to
concede that there might be some yet-to-be-discovered way to fruitfully apply MBs in the
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debate over vehicle externalism. So perhaps what I’m really doing here is challenging FEP
enthusiasts to show us that there is such an application.
Will FEP theorists be able to meet this challenge? Of course, only time will tell. But, on
my assessment, the prospects for the FEP theorists are not rosy. For, as signaled when placing
caveats #1 and #2, here I have adopted the most charitable reading of the FEP and of its
ontological commitments (at least when it comes to adjudicating the truth of vehicle
externalism via MBs). So it seems to me correct to conclude that FEP theorists eager to meet
my challenge will have to fight an uphill battle: they will both have to rebuke my arguments,
and to persuade others (e.g. Bruineberg et al. 2020; Menary and Gillett 2020) that the
conception of MBs they deploy is indeed the right one.
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